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On the Minority Game : Analytical and Numerical Studies
Damien Challet and Yi-Cheng Zhang
Institut de Physique The´orique, Universite´ de Fribourg, 1700 Fribourg
We investigate further several properties of the minority
game we have recently introduced. We explain the origin of
the phase transition and give an analytical expression of σ2/N
in the N ≪ 2M region. The ability of the players to learn a
given payoff is also analyzed, and we show that the Darwinian
evolution process tends to a self-organized state, in particular,
the life-time distribution is a power-law with exponent -2. Fur-
thermore, we study the influence of identical players on their
gain and on the system’s performance. Finally, we show that
large brains always take advantage of small brains.
Recently we have studied a simple model of a minority
game [1] that captures the essential features of the “bar-
problem” of Arthur ( [2] and [3]). N players compete with
each other and act by induction and adaptation. They must
choose one side between the two at each time step and those
who happen to be in the minority side win. They receive a
reward when making the right choice, keep in memory the
M last sides which were the right ones and use this knowl-
edge to act at the next time step. Each player possesses a
finite set of S strategies and uses the one which would have
been the most rewarding if it had been used since the begin-
ning. A strategy is a behavior rule that stipulates an action
for every information possible (see [1] or [4] for more details).
Recently, Savit, Manuca and Riolo [5] have studied the step
payoff case where each player has the same memory M and
only two strategies. They have found a phase transition with
parameter ρ = 2M/N .
Here, we continue the study of the payoff learning and the
Darwinism’s process initiated in [1] and introduce other in-
teresting sights of the model. We also give a geometrical
explanation of the phase transition and find an analytical ex-
pression of σ2/N in the N ≪ 2M region.
I. LEARNING OF DIFFERENT PAYOFFS
The simplest payoff consists in giving a point for every good
choice, i.e. the individual payoff function is equal to one, the
global payoff is equal to w, the number of winners. It fits
the minority game, but in most other real situations the win-
ners must share limited resources. For example, consider the
global payoff Fa,b(w) = aw + b. By varying a and b, we can
reproduce some real situations; for instance, the lottery game
corresponds to a = 0, b > 0 and the so-called step payoff
function is obtained with a > 0 and b = 0. In general, a
player wishes to maximize his profit, i.e. a priori the individ-
ual payoff function f(w). It is tempting to gain the maximum
of f(w) at each time step, but it occurs in average only ev-
ery N/ 〈w〉 time steps, thus the system is expected to try to
get the average number of winners giving the maximum of
the global payoff function F (w) = f(w)w, say wmax. The
wmax = 1 case reveals one limit of the model due its binary
nature. Each player would like to win alone, but he has to
face the reality : the minimum number of winners is equal to
N/2S in average, whose all strategies give the same answer to
this information. If S = 2 and wmax = N/2 it is a security,
but it is harmful when N/2s ≥ wmax. If wmax ∼ N/2S , N/2S
players sometimes win huge rewards, but it only happens in-
termittently and always after the same information, because
the other players are blinded by the enormous virtual gain;
thus there are only two groups of roughly N/2S people that
can hit the jackpot. The morals is the following : one can
win a lot, but not intentionally. If the global payoff has a
maximum in wmax greater enough than N/2
S , the system
can manage to maximize the global payoff. For instance, we
take f(w) = w(N/2−w), that is, F (w) = w2(N/2−w) has a
maximum in N/3. If N = 101, M = 6 and S = 15, it is clear
that the peaks are in w = N/3 (see figure 1).
Nevertheless there are conditions under which the system
can get two peaks. In general, if ρ > ρc the histogram of
the attendance at side A can only have one peak centered
on N/2. If ρ < ρc the histogram has at least two peaks
that are symmetrical with respect to N/2 and whose positions
strongly depend on ρ, and, if wmax = N/2, a peak centered
in N/2. Consequently, if wmax ≪ N , a system can maximize
the global gain only if N ≫ 2M and N ≪ 2S .
N/2N/3 2N/30 N
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FIG. 1. Histogram of the attendance nA at side A
(N = 101, M = 6, S = 15). The system has maximized
the global payoff w2(N/2−w) by getting the typical number
of winners equal to N/3
II. DARWINISM
The Darwinism process is the same as in [1] : every τ time
steps, the worst player is replaced by a clone of the best, ex-
cept that one strategy is redrawn with a small probability
1
p in order to allow regeneration, and that the virtual gains
of the strategies are reset to zero, like a new born baby. If
the new player is a pure clone of the best one, one says that
both belong to the same species. A demonstration of the Dar-
winism’s benefits can be seen in figure 2 : the latter shows
a comparison between the variance of the attendance signal
with and without Darwinism. The region where σ2/N < 1/4
is much greater when evolution takes place, in particular the
ρ < ρc region is less affected by the overcrowding. Note that
increasing p lowers σ2/N , that is, the mutations are useful.
The asymptotical behaviors of σ2/N in the ρ → ∞ limit de-
pends on p, but the Darwinism is harmful in this region. One
also sees that the minimum of σ2/N is not as the same ρ than
without Darwinism. One can wonder why the coordination is
better in the crowded phase although there are multiple clones
of a lot of players. Savit et al. [5] pointed out the existence of
a harmful process of period 2, more precisely, the first time
an information is given to the system, N/2 +O(
√
N) players
choose one given side; the next time the same information
occurs, N/2 + O(N) players go to the opposite side. When
evolution takes part, due to the fact that the new player loses
the virtual gains of the strategies he gets, the periodic process
fades away because the harmful coordination vanishes.
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FIG. 2. Dependence of σ2/N in ρ with Darwinism for
p = 0.01 (stars) and p = 0.1 (squares) (M = 5, S = 2,
τ = 10). The dashed line represents the random performance
and the dotted line is σ2/N without Darwinism.
Since p < 1, the diversity (the number of different species)
is reduced by the evolutionary process, and tends to a value
that depends on p. Indeed, if p = 1, the diversity remains
equal to N ; when p decreases, the diversity decreases too,
but stays over N/2 even if p = 0. Even more, when one starts
with only one species, but with random virtual gains, the
system performs first very badly, slowly improves itself, and
reaches an optimal diversity always greater than N/2. When
the diversity is stable, the system is in a stationary state,
and one can study several distributions. First, figure 3 shows
the distribution of the species life time. It is a power law
with exponent −2.02 ± 0.02, which does not depend on the
parameters (τ , p, ...). Fortunately, it is the same exponent as
found in real life evolution [6]). Figure 4 helps to understand
what happens. The average gain of several players during
the game is plotted. One can see players remaining in the
game, some other resisting for a while, then disappearing.
The player that replaces a dead one is followed. This figure
shows that the fluctuations of the average gain is very high
when a player is young. Consequently such a player’s death
or reproduction are more likely than those of an old player;
that leads to punctuated equilibrium, explaining the origin of
the power law distributions.
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FIG. 3. Distribution of species life time (N=101, M=8,
S=2, NIT=500000, τ=10). The straight line has a -2 ex-
ponent. The right part of the distribution does not lie on the
same line, because of fluctuations.
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FIG. 4. Temporal evolution of the average gain of several
players (N = 51, M = 10, S = 2, τ=10). Note the conse-
quences of the death of a player at t=1450 and t=2100.
After sufficient time, it is interesting to plot the number
of members composing each species against their rank (see
figure 5). One find a power law that depends at least on p;
indeed, if p = 1, the best performer will never be completely
cloned and one obtains a flat line : every type of player has
only one member.
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FIG. 5. Rank of the members in a type of player
(N = 20001, S = 5, M = 5, τ = 10). It is a power-law,
but the exponent depends on the system’s parameters.
In order to know if the proposed Darwinian process is the
good one, we have tried to apply the inverse process : a clone
of the worse player replaces the best one. The figure 6 shows
that the global performance suffers a lot.
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FIG. 6. Anti Darwinism : a clone of the worst player re-
places the best. The attendance at side A is plotted with
dots.
III. EXPLANATION OF THE PHASE
TRANSITION
Let us now discuss in detail figure 7 where the phase tran-
sition clearly appears. Considering the step payoff function,
one has plotted σ2/N against ρ = 2M/N for S = 2, 3, 4, 5; the
dashed line σ2/N = 1/4 gives the performance that would be
attained if every player chose its side randomly. Let us call
ρc the X-coordinate where σ
2/N is minimal. Three regions
appear : i) ρ ≪ ρc : in this region, σ2/N ∼ 1/ρ, that is,
σ2/N2 ∼ 1/2M ; keeping M constant and increasing N pro-
duces only a dilatation of the system, whose origin is discussed
below; ii) ρ ∼ ρc : the fluctuations are minimal and the sys-
tem performs better than by coin-tossing; iii) ρ≫ ρc : σ2/N
tends to 1/4, the random case’s performance, because the
players are not any more enough to coordinate.
One sees that increasing the number of strategies reduces
the ρ ∼ ρc region, and that σ2/N depends only on ρ if ρ is
large. Furthermore, ρc is roughly linear in S, as one can see
on the following table (values are only approximative) :
S ρc
2 1/2
3 4/3
4 2
5 5/2
6 4
8 6
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FIG. 7. Dependence of σ2/N on ρ for S = 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
(circles, triangles, stars, x and diamonds) (M = 8). The con-
tinuous line is the plot of 1/x, and the dashed one represents
the random case’s performance.
This figure leads up to two questions. First, since a player
completely ignores the details of the other players’ strategies,
how is it possible that the system performs better than by
coin tossing ? Second, why is the parameter ρ = 2M/N the
good one, that is, what is the meaning of ρ ? Indeed we know
that there are 22
M
strategies. One would have expected the
phase transition to occur when N ∼ 22M . Why is it not the
case ?
First it is clear that the only way the players can interact
is the virtual values of their strategies. The coordination oc-
curs because there is some information in these values. The
nature of this information is the following. Since a strategy
consists in 2M bits, it belongs to an hypercube of dimension
2M , HM . For all s ∈ HM , s(i) ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , 2M are the
components of s. We take the |.|1 distance on this hypercube,
also called hamming distance, which counts the number of
different bits : let s and t ∈ HM , then
3
DM (s, t) =
2M∑
i=1
|s(i)− t(i)|.
For convenience, we introduce the normalized distance
dM (s, t) = DM (s, t)/2
M . Now, given an information, the
probability for these two strategies of reacting the same way
is given by 1 − dM (s, t). Therefore, using the strategy with
the highest virtual value is equivalent to choosing the one that
has the smallest probability to reacting in the same way as
the other players. It is clear now that the virtual value of a
strategy is related to its average distance from all strategies
used by all other players. Of course each player’s dream is to
have at each time step at least a strategy that has been in
average further than 1/2 from all other players’ used strate-
gies. Let us define 〈d〉, the average actual distance between
the players by computing the average distance between the
strategies being used at this moment by the players at each
time step, and by averaging this quantity over the whole his-
tory of the game. One sees on figure 8 that 〈d〉 is actually
greater than 1/2 as soon as σ2/N < 1/4. Even more, there
is a linear relationship between 〈d〉 and σ2/N , as shown on
figure 9.
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FIG. 8. Log-log plot of the average actual distance 〈d〉
against ρ (N=51, M = 2, .., 11, S = 2).
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FIG. 9. Linear relationship between σ2/N and 〈d〉. The
continuous line shows a linear fit.
There are 22
M
different strategies. But take a strategy and
change only one bit of it. The distance between these two
strategies is 1/2M , that is, they are not really different. The
question is now : given s, a strategy, how many strategies are
significantly different from s ? Of course, there is one strategy
s that is exactly the inverse of s : s(i) = 1−s(i), i = 1, . . . , 2M ,
but one can consider too all strategies which are at a distance
of 1/2 from s, so to say uncorrelated with s. Note that if
s and t are uncorrelated, s is also uncorrelated with t. In
appendix A, we show that an ensemble whose all elements
are mutually uncorrelated contains at most 2M elements, and
give a method to build such an ensemble given a strategy.
Let s be a strategy and UM such an ensemble that contains s.
Then let UM be such that for all t in UM , t belongs to UM .
All elements of UM , except s itself are uncorrelated with s, as
do all elements of UM , except s. So, given a strategy s, there
are 2 · 2M − 2 strategies uncorrelated with s, and, of course,
one totally anti-correlated. This property clarifies the number
of strategies which are really different : it is the cardinal of
VM = UM ∪ UM , 2 · 2M . The ensemble VM can be called the
reduced strategy space. Note that given a strategy s there are
22
M
−1 UM that contain s, but that VM is unique in the sense
that if t ∈ VM and t ∈ V ′M , then VM = V ′M . Of course,
a given strategy always belongs to such an ensemble, related
to VM by a given number of reflections. In other words VM
defines a geometrical structure on the hypercube HM .
It is clear now why the quantity N
2M
is a fundamental pa-
rameter : it is proportional to the number of drawn strategies
over the cardinal of VM , i.e. to the inverse of the density of
the system in the reduced strategy space. Therefore, the right
parameter should be 2·2
M
SN
.
The fundamental role of VM is shown by the following ex-
perience. Since it is easy to construct VM , we can model our
model by forcing the players to draw their strategies from a
given VM . We plot σ
2/N versus ρ (see figure III). One see
that σ2/N is really very close to the original one. What do
we learn from this comparison ? First in the crowded phase
(ρ ≪ ρc), we saw that σ2/N2 ∝ 1/2M . If M is constant, a
system that only differs from another one by N is just a di-
latation of the latter. When all strategies belong to VM ,
S N
2·2M
4
is the average number of times each strategy has been drawn,
thus the cause of the dilatation is obvious.
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FIG. 10. σ2/N versus ρ obtained by drawing all the strate-
gies from VM (M = 8, S = 2). The continuous line shows the
original σ2/N , and the dashed line indicates the performance
of the random case. The two curves are very close together,
testifying the fundamental role of VM
Let us now discuss the better-than-random phase. It is
tractable analytically in the ρ ≫ 1 limit, since two strate-
gies are either the same, or uncorrelated, or anti-correlated,
which implies that two players are not bound together un-
less they have identical or anti-correlated strategies. Suppose
that S = 2; if N ≪ 2M , it is easy to compute the average
maximal number of anti-correlated strategies, 〈l〉. Under the
hypothesis that a strategy is drawn at most once and that a
player cannot possess two anti-correlated strategies, the joint
probability that the system can have l pairs of anti-correlated
strategies and that n drawn strategies belong to UM is given
by
p(l ∪ n) = C
n
l C
2M−n
n−l
C2Nn
C2
M
n
22N
θ(n− l)
=
Cnl C
2M−n
2N−n−l C
2N
n
C2
M
2N−n 2
2N
θ(n− l), (1)
where n, respectively. n, is the number of strategies be-
longing to UM , respectively. UM (of course n+n = 2N), and
θ(x) is the Heavyside function. Thus the average number of
anti-correlated strategy in the system is equal to
〈l〉 =
N∑
n=0
C2Nn
C2
M
2N−n 2
2N
n∑
l=1
l Cnl C
2M−n
2N−n−l
+
2N∑
n=N+1
C2Nn
C2
M
2N−n 2
2N
2N−n∑
l=1
l Cnl C
2M−n
2N−n−l
=
N(N − 1/2)
2M
. (2)
Obtaining σ2/N is now straightforward. If the system con-
sists of N uncorrelated players, σ2/N = 1/4. Now, if there
are 〈l〉 pairs of anti-correlated players, only N − 2 〈l〉 players
are still uncorrelated, and
σ2
N
=
1
4
− 〈l〉
2N
. (3)
Here,
σ2th
N
=
1
4
− N − 1/2
2 · 2M . (4)
Note that σ2th/N tends to 1/4 like N/2
M . Since 〈l〉 is the
average maximal number of anti-correlated strategies, σ2th/N
is a kind of lower bound for σ2/N as it appears on figure
11, on which one can see that this approximation holds for
N ≪ 2M . One can also analytically find that σ2/N linearly
depends on 〈d〉 at least in this region. Indeed, using equation
(3), the fact that
〈d〉 = 1
2
(
1 +
〈l〉
N − 1
)
, (5)
and dropping the terms of order 1/N2 yield to the equation
σ2
N
≃ 1
4
− C
(
〈d〉 − 1
2
)
, (6)
where C is a constant equal to 1 in this case, but depends
at least onM and N in the original model’s case; for instance,
C ≃ 0.0302 on figure 9. Equation (6) indicates that σ2/N =
1/4 if 〈d〉 = 1/2 and that σ2/N < 1/4 as soon as 〈d〉 > 1/2
(see figures 8 and 7). One might find analytical relationships
in the other regions by allowing a strategy to be drawn several
times.
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FIG. 11. Theoretical (continuous line) and original
1/4 − σ2/N versus ρ = 2M/N for M = 8 (squares), M = 10
(stars) and M = 12 (circles) (S = 2). The fluctuations are
quite important due to the small number of players. One sees
the approximation is good if N ≪ 2M
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IV. INFLUENCE OF IDENTICAL PLAYERS
In this section, we study the effect of cloning a player sev-
eral times on the system and on the player. One starts with
n players having exactly the same strategies and all virtual
values set to zero. Figure 12 shows the average gain of such
players against their relative number in the system n/N –
note that one keeps N constant. One sees that their gain
is well fitted by a quadratic function and is equal to zero at
nm =≃ 20.
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FIG. 12. Average gain of n identical players against n/N
(circles), 〈g〉0−B(n) with wm = 38 (dashed line) and wm = 30
(dotted line) (N = 101, M = 10, S = 2, NIT=5000).
Calculating the influence of n on the identical players is
easy : suppose that at a given time step the cloned player
wins if n = 0; let w be the number of winners ; if w+n < N/2,
nothing changes for them. But if w + n > N/2, the identical
players and those who made the same choice lose. That means
in particular that the cloned player wins less than before. One
can estimate the prejudice B for the cloned player :
B(n) =
(N−1)/2∑
w=0
P (w) 〈g〉0 θ(w + n−N/2)
= 〈g〉0
(N−1)/2∑
w=(N+1)/2−n
P (w), (7)
where 〈g〉0 is the average gain of the cloned player when n =
0 and P (w) is the probability that the system gets w winners.
Of course one does not know P (w), but figure 13 shows that
one can well approximate P (w) by a linear function,
P (w) ≃
{
0 if w < wm
aw + b if wm ≤ w < N/2 , (8)
where a and b are such that P (wm) = 0 and P is normal-
ized, that is, b = −awm and
a =
2[
N2 − 1
4
− wm(N − wm)
] . (9)
Thus,
B(n) ≃ a
2
[
−n2 +
(
N
2
− wm
)
n
]
〈g〉0 . (10)
We eventually define
〈g〉 (n) = 〈g〉0 (1−B(n)) . (11)
Before one can plot 〈g〉 (n), one must find the numerical
value of wm. One has two choices. The first one is the mean
field way : one suppose that the behavior of the remaining
non-cloned players does not differ from the n = 0 case, and
one tries to map the form of PnA by taking wm = 38 ; the
resulting 〈g〉 (n) is the dashed line on figure 12 and apperas
to be too pessimistic. The second one is to consider that
the adaptative way by whom all the players, including the
identical ones, use their strategies allows to take wm such
that PnA(x ≤ wm) = 0, that is, wm = 30 ; the result is
the dotted line on the same figure and is very close to the
experimental data.
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FIG. 13. Probability distribution of attendance at side A,
PnA (same parameters as on figure 12).
If one plots σ2/N against n/N (figure 14), one sees that
σ2/N remains roughly constant when n/N is small, then
grows up. If n/N > wm, σ
2/N grows like (n/N)2 ; indeed,
since the identical players always lose, the number of losers
grows linearly with n. One the other hand, figure 15 shows
the average gain of the non-cloned players. One note that
they take advantage of the situation as soon as n > 0 and
that the average gain grows beyond 1/2 and stays roughly
constant as soon as the average gain of the identical players
fall to zero ; it is a consequence of the adaptative use of the
strategies
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FIG. 14. σ2/N against n/N . The right part grows like(
n
N
)2
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FIG. 15. Average gain of the non-cloned players
Note that the studied system was such that ρ > ρc. If
ρ < ρc, the prejudice B(n) is still a growing with n function,
but approximating P (w) is more difficult since the histogram
of the attendance at side A has three peaks, and accordingly
B(n) is more complicate. One sees on figure 16 that σ2/N
has minimum, because the actual number of different players
is N − n, consequently ρ increases when n grows.
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FIG. 16. σ2/N against n/N . Note that σ2/N has a mini-
mum.
V. EFFICIENCY
One interesting feature of our model is the following : sup-
pose that ρ < ρc, then the game is efficient in the sense that
given an information, the two sides win with equal probability
at next time step; reversly, if ρ > ρc, the game is inefficient.
Even more, suppose that NM players have the same memory
M and that the game is efficient, then the game is inefficient
for hypothetical players who would have a memory equal to
M + 1 [5]. Since the latter can take advantage from the sit-
uation, it is interesting to add NM+1 of them to the game
in order to see what they can win and when the inefficieny
disappears for the M +1 memory. On figure 17 one plots the
average gain of the profiteers and of the victims. The latter
grows a little bit and then stays roughly constant; indeed, the
cleverness of the profiteers compensates the bad performance
of the victims. The gain of the profiteers starts from over
1/2, linearly decreases until NM+1 ≃ NM , falling below 1/2
at NM+1 = NM/2, and then decreases less than linearly, but
it is not clear whether their gain eventually stabilizes above
the victims’ one. Therefore, one characterizes the inefficiency
of the system for players with memory M by σM defined by
σ2M =
1
2M
2M∑
i=1
(P (A|i)− 1/2)2, (12)
where i an information of length M and P (A|i) is the con-
ditionnal probability that the winning side will be A at next
time step given the information i. If σM = 0, the system is
efficient. When one plots NM+1σM+1 against NM+1, one sees
that σM+1 behave like 1/NM+1 when NM+1 is roughly greater
than NM , that is, σM+1 decreases very slowly. That indicates
that the profiteers can always take advantage of the victims.
Finally, figure 19 shows that the average gain of the profiteers
is monotonically related to σM+1, since the inefficiency σM+1
is a measure of the opportunist gains the profiteers can get.
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FIG. 17. Average gain of the profiteers (circles) and of the
victims (squares) against the number of profiteers (NM=101,
NM+1 = 2, . . . , 300, M = 3, S = 2).
0 100 200 300
NM+1
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
N
M
+1
 σ
M
+1
FIG. 18. NM+1σM+1 against NM+1, showing that
σM+1 ∼ 1/NM+1 when NM+1 > NM .
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FIG. 19. Monotonical relationship between the average
gain of the profiteers and σM+1.
VI. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
Although being simple, our model is very rich and allows a
lot of variations. For instance, the minority game seems to be
a special case of the bar problem, but one should not think the
binary nature of our game prevents the system from learning
a different from N/2 threshold. Indeed, one just has to modify
the payoff by breaking the symmetry between the sides A and
B : the players at side A win a point if they are less than αN
(0 < α < 1); reversely, if there are more than αN players
at side A, those who choose the side B win. The results are
roughly the same as before, except that the game is no more
symmetrical. On the other hand, one should argue that our
model would be more realistic if the oldest virtual gains of
the strategies were not kept in memory. One can modify the
model in such a way that only the T newest virtual gains
are taken into account to determine which strategy a player
uses. This modification does not change the properties a lot,
in particular figure 7, if T is not too small with respect to
M , lets the model be Markovian of order T and might help
to exactly solve the model. One can also imagine weighing
the virtual gains, that is, multiplying the reward gained t
time steps ago by ct where 0 < c < 1 in order to include a
progressive oblivion; one might find a critical value of c, as in
the prisoner’s dilemma [7].
VII. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed some interesting properties of our model;
in particular, we have given a geometrical explanation of the
phase transition, which has allowed us to find an analytical
expression of σ2/N in the ρ ≫ 1 region. Nevertheless, an
analytical solution of the whole model is still missing, being
rather hard to find due to the adaptative use of the strategies.
Consequently, one could be interested in another approach
proposed by one of us [4] : one only gives one binary strategy
to each player; there are active and passive players; the active
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ones play the minority game, the passive ones observe, waiting
for the best moment to play. This model might reproduce
some of the properties of ours and permit an easier analytical
approach.
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APPENDIX A:
In this appendix we show that an ensemble of strategies
whose all elements are uncorrelated contains at most 2M el-
ements. The proof also gives a method to build such an en-
semble given a strategy s ∈ HM . Without loss of generality,
we consider s(i) = 0, i = 1, . . . , 2M . We note UM a maximal
subset of HM such that all its elements are mutually uncorre-
lated and that it contains s; note that UM is not unique (see
above). It is easy to build UM from UM−1. If a, b ∈ HM−1
one defines the direct product a⊗ b by
(a⊗ b)(i) =
{
a(i) if 1 ≤ i ≤ 2M−1
b(i− 2M−1) if 2M−1 < i ≤ 2M .
This product actually extends a ∈ HM−1 in HM by ap-
pending the components of b. The ensemble UM is simply
obtained from UM−1 by taking all a ∈ UM−1, and putting
a ⊗ a and a ⊗ a in UM . It is easy to see that all elements of
UM are mutually uncorrelated. Since U0 = {(0)}, UM con-
tains 2M elements and one proves that its size is maximal by
recurrence :
(i) clearly, U1 = {(0, 0); (0, 1)} is as large as possible.
(ii) suppose that the size of UM−1 is maximal.
(iii) let h ∈ HM ; suppose that ∀ u ∈ UM (u 6= h),
dM (h, u) = 1/2. Consider now one a ∈ UM , a 6= h; one
can decompose h in h1 ⊗ h2 where h1, h2 ∈ HM−1, and a in
b⊗ c where b, c ∈ UM−1; remember that c = b or c = b. Since
b⊗ c and b⊗ c ∈ UM ,
dM (h, a) =
1
2
(dM−1(h1, b) + dM−1(h2, c))
=
1
2
(dM−1(h1, b) + dM−1(h2, c))
=
1
2
(dM−1(h1, b) + 1− dM−1(h2, c)) = 1/2 (A1)
Thus dM−1(h2, c) = 1/2, then h2 ∈ UM−1, as does h1,
that is, h ∈ UM . In other words, UM contains at most 2M
elements.
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